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The role of committed minorities in shaping public opinion has been recently addressed with
the help of multi-agent models. However, previous studies focused on homogeneous populations
where zealots stand out only for their stubbornness. Here, we consider the more general case in
which individuals are characterized by different propensities to communicate. In particular, we
correlate commitment with a higher tendency to push an opinion, acknowledging the fact that
individuals with unwavering dedication to a cause are also more active in their attempts to promote
their message. We show that these activists are not only more efficient in spreading their message
but that their efforts require an order of magnitude fewer individuals than a randomly selected
committed minority to bring the population over to a new consensus. Finally, we address the role
of communities, showing that partisan divisions in the society can make it harder for committed
individuals to flip the status-quo social consensus.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k,89.65.-s,64.60.aq
I. INTRODUCTION
Social change is often produced by committed groups
that challenge the status-quo [1, 2]. Sometimes the
transformation is significant, and the new social order
is a-posteriori considered an improvement over the old
regime. Examples include universal suffrage [3], the abo-
lition of the transatlantic slave trade, and racial deseg-
regation in the public sphere[4]. More often, the change
consists of the emergence of a new social consensus on
opinions and behaviors that do not seem to be better
than the ones they replaced. This is the case we will
consider in the present paper. A prominent example con-
cerns shifts in the adoption of social conventions, which
by definition are arbitrary behaviors or rules of action
[5]. This is the case of the constant renewal of current
day slang [6], cultural fads, and fashion [7]. In general,
the reshaping of consensus can be extremely fast, and
the coexistence between supporters of the old and new
status-quo short-lived.
A natural question concerns the dynamics leading a
minority opinion backed by committed supporters to be-
come dominant. Insight into this problem was recently
obtained by theoretical work and multi-agent modeling
[8–15]. In particular, refs [8–10] introduced commitment
in the context of the Naming Game model of convention
formation [16, 17], which has recently been shown to re-
produce accurately experimental results on the sponta-
neous emergence of conventions [18]. The model allows
agents to hold more than one opinion at the same time,
and thus describes ‘undecided’ or ‘neutral’ agents natu-
rally. In the model [16], agents interact in pairs, chosen
uniformly at random; one of them playing as speaker and
the other as hearer, or listener. The speaker randomly
selects one of her opinions and transmits it to the hearer.
If the hearer holds it in her list, then both speaker and
listener retain only that opinion. Otherwise, the listener
adds the opinion to her inventory. Thus, when the num-
ber of opinions is constrained to two, agents can be di-
vided into three groups, namely those who hold opinion
A, those who hold opinion B and those who hold both
opinions, AB [19]. A committed minority of individu-
als that only retain and propagate one opinion can easily
flip a majority of individuals initially holding the other
opinion provided that its size exceeds a critical value
pc ≃ 10% [8, 9]. Interestingly, this value also holds for
the general Naming Game case of O(N) opinions in the
system [20] and for a different model on interdependent
networks [21].
However, the majority of previous studies did not con-
sider that committed individuals are not only less prone
to abandon the opinion they have, but they are usually
also more active in trying to convince other people [22–
25]. Activity-driven networks appear particularly suit-
able to take these activists into account, as they attach
to each node a variable, called “activity”, that describes
the propensity of the node to establish new connections
at a given time [26]. Committed activists are then easily
described by assigning a large value of activity to them.
It is important to notice that in the classic Naming Game
each node is selected uniformly at random, a scenario
that corresponds to a homogenous distribution of activ-
ity.
In this paper, we consider the Naming Game model
with committed activists on activity driven networks. To
this end, we first study a variant of the Naming Game in
which only the listeners update their opinion post inter-
action [27]. The listener only model allows us to separate
the role of speaker and listener, which is useful in activity
driven networks where multiple nodes can be speakers at
the same time. In the first stage we consider a system
characterized by homogenous activity. We show analyti-
cally that the threshold of the minimal required commit-
ted minority pc for the listener only variant is around 7%
2of the population (as estimated in [28]), i.e. smaller than
the ≃ 10% obtained when both agents negotiate their po-
sition [8, 9]. Then, we extend our analysis considering a
population of agents described by a heterogeneous distri-
bution of activity. If the activity of the individuals is not
correlated to their role (i.e., to be committed or not),
the threshold pc turns out to be the same as found in
the previous case where each node is selected uniformly
at random. Interestingly, we show that a much smaller
minority can quickly influence the whole system when
committed individuals are more active than the rest of
the population. Finally, we consider how a polarized so-
cial network, where individuals thinking alike tend to be
more connected with each other than to individuals re-
taining a different opinion, can hinder the effectiveness
of a committed minority [8, 29].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: We
start by introducing the Naming Game with commit-
ted minorities on temporal networks in Section II. Next
we investigate the case of activists as the proponents of
the new social convention and the extent of their advan-
tage in Section III. In Section IV we consider collective
opinion flipping with committed agents on a real net-
work with community structures built from a network of
two weakly connected political blog communities. We are
able to show that activists hold a clear advantage over a
committed minority chosen at random regardless of net-
work structures present. Finally we discuss our results
in the Conclusion and provide an Appendix for a thor-
ough explanation of the approach taken to arrive at our
analytical results.
II. COMMITTED MINORITIES IN THE
NAMING GAME
The microscopic rules of the Naming Game (NG)
model are simple [16]. At every time step two agents
are selected to interact uniformly at random, one as a
speaker and the other as a listener. The speaker ran-
domly selects one of her opinions and shares it with the
listener. If the listener has the opinion in her inventory,
then both agents retain that opinion and forget all oth-
ers. If not, the listener adds the opinion to her inventory.
This process repeats until all agents agree upon one opin-
ion and only that opinion. Agents begin the game with
no prior knowledge of any opinions and new opinions are
created by speakers who have none to share.
Here, we will focus on the case where only 2 opinions
are possible [19], also known as the binary NG[9, 27].
Thus agents belong to one of three possible groups; those
with opinion A, mA, those with opinion B, nB, or those
with both A and B, nAB, such that mA + nB + nAB =
1. With A as the opinion of the committed minority,
the group holding opinion A can be further split into
two; those who can be influenced and persuaded to adopt
opinion B, nA, and zealots committed to opinion A, p,
so that mA = nA + p.
In the NG, and also in previous studies with committed
individuals, both speakers and listeners negotiate their
opinion state for each interaction. In this paper, we will
focus on the listener only or hearer only NG a variant
where only the listener updates their opinion after an
interaction, which yields the same scaling of convergence
time with population size N as observed in the usual NG
[27].
With our interests lying in the study of collective opin-
ion flipping, we consider the case in which only the com-
mitted minority know of the new convention (A) at the
beginning, while everyone else agrees on the old conven-
tion (B). Previous studies of the NG with committed
minorities considered this scenario resulting in a critical
size of the committed minority pc ≃ 10% [8, 9]. In the
hearer only NG variant (hereafter referred to as the NG)
we find the critical size becomes smaller with pc ≃ 7%.
This result is derived from a fixed point stability anal-
ysis of the mean field rate equations for the densities of
agents in the separate states A and B, as detailed below.
Committed minority threshold for the Hearer-Only
Naming Game
With the density of committed agents fixed to p and all
agents having a priori knowledge of at least one opinion,
the fraction of the population knowing A and B is given
by nAB = 1−nA−nB−p. The mean field rate equations
of the states are then easily obtained by considering the
possible interactions listed in Table I. They read:
n˙A = −nAnB + 1
2
nAnAB +
1
2
n2AB + pnAB (1)
n˙B = −nAnB + 1
2
nBnAB +
1
2
n2AB − pnB (2)
The terms on the right of (1) describe the number of
agents leaving and joining the state nA according to dif-
ferent interaction pairs. In particular, the first considers
individuals who leave nA after hearing from a speaker
with only B in their memory. The second is a combined
term describing those who join nA from nAB after hear-
ing from a speaker with only A in their memory and those
who leave nA after hearing B from a speaker with A and
B, where both have equal probability to be transmitted.
The terms on the right of (2) are similar but describing
the number of agents leaving and joining state nB.
Following the analysis of Xie, et al [9], we determine
the conditions of existence for the fixed points of the
above mean field rate equations. Simplifying our nota-
tion by replacing nA with x and nB with y, we get the
following:
3Speaker Listener Listener
before interaction after interaction
A,Ac A,AB A
B AB
Ac Ac
B A AB
B,AB B
Ac Ac
AB
A
−→ A,AB A
B AB
Ac Ac
AB
B
−→ A AB
B,AB B
Ac Ac
TABLE I. Interaction outcomes for different speaker-listener
pairs in the 2 state (hearer only) NG. For speakers in the
state AB there are two possible opinions to share; the opin-
ion shared is indicated above the arrow. Ac refers to agents
committed to opinion A.
x˙ =− xy + 1
2
x(1 − x− y − p) + 1
2
(1− x− y − p)2 (3)
+ p(1− x− y − p)
y˙ =− xy + 1
2
y(1− x− y − p) + 1
2
(1− x− y − p)2 − py
(4)
The fixed points of this system correspond to (x,y) points
which satisfy x˙ = y˙ = 0, giving us:
x =
(1− y)2 − p2
1 + y + p
(5)
y =
(1− x− p)2
1 + x+ p
(6)
With (3) substituted into (4) we get:
2y(1 + y + p)
(
3y2 + 4(p− 1)y + (p+ 1)2) = 0 (7)
The fixed point values of y, y∗, are given by solutions of
this expression.
Neglecting trivial solutions, the third factor in (7) gives
one or two additional fixed points depending on the pa-
rameter p:
y∗ = −2(p− 1)±
√
p2 − 14p+ 1
3
(8)
The only physical solution gives pc = 7− 4
√
3 ≈ 0.0718,
confirming the previous numerical estimate pc = 0.08 ±
FIG. 1. Numerical results for convergence time Tconv in the bi-
nary NG with a randomly selected committed minority for a pop-
ulation of N = 104 agents. Only two opinions are possible: A or
B, with a state of consensus reached when everyone knows only
opinion A. Committed agents begin with knowledge of A and in-
troduce this new opinion to the rest of the population who initially
know opinion B. The median of 100 simulations show that con-
vergence time diverges at the analytically derived critical threshold
of pc ≈ 0.0718. The 95% and 50% confidence intervals are shown
shaded in dark and light grey.
0.01 of [28]. At pc the additional fixed points afforded
by (8) collapse to a single point to give the fixed state
(nA,nB) = (0.0829, 0.6188), a saddle point which splits
off into two fixed points for 0 ≤ p ≤ pc. The existence of
fixed points where y∗ 6= 0 indicates the possibility of sta-
ble states for the population in which opinion B persists
and convergence is never met. Then pc also represents a
critical threshold around which convergence time Tconv
diverges (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 shows that as p → pc, average convergence
time begins to diverge in simulations of the NG for a
population of 104 agents. At minimum then ∼ 7% of the
population must be committed to opinion A in order to
strike an effective mutiny against the prevailing opinion
B.
Committed minorities in heterogeneous populations
Thus far we have considered the NG in homogeneous
populations, where all individuals have the same proba-
bility of speaking. However, in real life social networks
are comprised of individuals heterogeneous in their ten-
dency to connect and communicate. To take this into
account, we consider activity-driven networks[26, 30, 31],
in which nodes are assigned an activity rate a which de-
scribes their propensity to communicate. At the start of
each time step t nodes activate with a probability a∆t
and connect to m random neighbours, where ∆t is the
duration of the step. At the next time step t + ∆t all
links are broken and the network is built anew. For our
model we only consider the case where active nodes con-
4nect to inactive nodes. Activity rates are values in the
interval (ǫ, 1), where ǫ << 1, and are given according to a
probability distribution function P (a). For a wide set of
large datasets describing social interactions the function
P (a) is shown to be a power law function of a such that
P (a) ∝ a−γ [26, 30, 32]. This results in a heavy-tailed ac-
tivity distribution with a lower activity cut-off ǫ. We will
use with this functional form for P (a) to produce pop-
ulations with wide varying rates of activity from which
we will select our activists, where γ = 2.5, ǫ = 10−3, and
each active agent connects to m = 1 inactive neighbors
per time step ∆t = 1.
We now consider the NG on these time varying net-
works where speakers are active nodes and listeners are
their m inactive neighbours. In this setting, listeners up-
date their opinion at the end of the time step. After all
speakers have communicated each listener will retain the
mode of their opinions. However, nodes have a proba-
bility ∝ N−2 of being a listener for s speakers during
a given time step, so that in large populations listeners
typically receive only one opinion in a given time step.
To determine the critical threshold pc it is convenient
to write down equations for each activity rate or class
a. Thus, nay represents the fraction of population whose
activity is a which holds opinion y, and pa is the frac-
tion of committed individuals with activity a. The rate
equations for the density of states A and B at each class
a are:
n˙aA =− naA
∑
a′
na
′
Ba
′ + naAB
∑
a′
na
′
Aa
′ − 1
2
naA
∑
a′
na
′
ABa
′
+
1
2
naAB
∑
a′
na
′
ABa
′ + naAB
∑
a′
pa
′
a′ (9)
n˙aB =− naB
∑
a′
na
′
Aa
′ + naAB
∑
a′
na
′
Ba
′ − 1
2
naB
∑
a′
na
′
ABa
′
+
1
2
naAB
∑
a′
na
′
ABa
′ − naB
∑
a′
pa
′
a′ (10)
where each summation is an average over all activity
classes for speakers in different states. For each term
in the above the left side describes the state of the lis-
tener in class a, the right side is the average speaker
communicating with them who can cause them to change
their position, while the factor in front is the probability
for this change. We can simplify these equations with
the use of the following notation: nA = x, nB = y,
nAB = z = 1 − x − y − p, X˜ =
∑
a n
a
Aa, Y˜ =
∑
a n
a
Ba,
Z˜ =
∑
a n
a
ABa.
Summing (9) and (10) over all classes of a then gives
us the full rate equations:
x˙ = −xY˜ + zX˜ − 1
2
xZ˜ +
1
2
zZ˜ + zp
〈
a
〉
(11)
y˙ = −yX˜ + zY˜ − 1
2
yZ˜ +
1
2
zZ˜ − yp〈a〉 (12)
where
∑
a p
aa = p〈a〉. This comes from committed
agents being randomly distributed among activity classes
resulting in pa being proportional to the probability of
agent having activity class a, thus pa = pP (a) so that
when summed over all classes the total density of com-
mitted agents is p.
With some consideration on the definition for z (see
Appendix), we find that Z˜ = 〈a〉−X˜− Y˜ −p〈a〉. We note
the existence of solutions for x and y relies only on the
existence of valid solutions for X˜ and Y˜ . Three steady
state solutions are found for X˜ and Y˜ through a fixed
point stability analysis of their rate equations (Appendix:
Activity-driven networks). Adopting the same line of
reasoning seen for homogeneously mixing populations, we
find pc = 7− 4
√
3.
This is the same critical threshold for pc obtained
for the case of a homogeneous activity distribution, and
numerical simulations support this result, once time is
rescaled so as to take into account multiple speakers at
each time step rather than a single speaker (Iconv now
instead of Tconv for the number of interactions needed
to reach convergence; see Figure 2). Thus, the introduc-
tion of varying rates of communication through activity
driven networks has no effect on pc when our committed
minority is selected at random while Iconv increases by
less than two orders of magnitude near pc.
From Figure 3 we see that increasing m - the number
of neighbors speakers communicate with at each step - by
an order of magnitude also has no effect on pc nor Iconv
with committed agents selected at random.
III. ACTIVISTS
Individuals committed to a cause are not only less
likely to leave their position but are also far more active
in recruiting others for their cause [22–24]. To describe
the presence of activists, we select the committed minor-
ity to be the most active agents in the population, thus
correlating the agent’s activity rate a with commitment.
These activists will communicate the most often in our
population and have many more opportunities to share
their message. Concretely, activists are now chosen to
be the Np agents with the highest activity rates a. This
results in a different definition of a committed agent of
activity class a. Only a range of high activity classes
are now selected according to pa ∝ P (a), while pa = 0
holds for the rest of the population since by definition no
activist comes from a low activity class. Hence,
pa =
{
P (a) ac ≤ a ≤ 1
0 a < ac
(13)
where ac is the lower limit of activity classes for activists
defined from the integral:
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Average number of interactions required to
reach convergence Iconv vs p in the NG in activity driven networks
for a population of N = 104 agents for 100 simulations (Top).
Iconv diverges at the same pc for random committed minorities
as in systems with homogenous activity distributions (Figure 1).
(Bottom) Activists (commitment correlated with high probability
to speak) on the other hand show considerable advantage in needing
fewer interactions to reach consensus and a numerical threshold of
pc ≈ 2 × 10−3, agreeing well with the analytically derived pc ≈
1× 10−3.
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FIG. 3. Comparison of average number of interactions required to
reach convergence Iconv vs p in the NG in activity driven networks
with N = 104 agents for m = 1 and 10 listeners per speaker per
time step. Iconv and the critical threshold pc remains the same
despite a tenfold increase in communication per step. Error bars
are not visible at the scale of the plot.
p =
∫ 1
ac
P (a)da, (14)
as the integral of all activists of the higher activity classes
must equal the total density of activists p in the popu-
lation. The lower limit of activity classes for activists
is:
ac =
(
1− p(1− ǫ−γ+1)) 1−γ+1 (15)
The rate equations (11) and (12) need to be modified
accordingly, resulting in
∑
a
paa =
∫ 1
ac
P (a)ada =
(−γ + 1
−γ + 2
)(
1− a−γ+2c
1− ǫ−γ+1
)
(16)
We will refer to this term as 〈ac〉; it is the average activity
of activists. Using this Z˜ becomes:
Z˜ = 〈a〉 − X˜ − Y˜ − 〈ac〉 (17)
and the rate equations for X˜ and Y˜ become:
˙˜
X = −X˜Y˜ + 1
2
X˜Z˜ +
1
2
Z˜2 + Z˜
〈
ac
〉
(18)
˙˜
Y = −X˜Y˜ + 1
2
Y˜ Z˜ +
1
2
Z˜2 − Y˜ 〈ac〉 (19)
Real solutions for X˜ and Y˜ yield the value pc ≈ 1.0×10−3
for the critical threshold. Below pc ≈ 1.0 × 10−3 then
we can expect to find stable states for the population
where opinion B never dies out and convergence to A
is never reached. Figure 2 shows that numerical simula-
tions for the case of activists agree well this theoretical
prediction. Convergence occurs for a significantly lower
range of p compared to a random committed minority
where pc ≈ 0.0718. The number of interactions needed to
reach convergence with activists begins to diverge around
p ≈ 2× 10−3.
IV. COMMUNITY STRUCTURE
In the real world, the effectiveness of activism might be
hindered by the tendency of individuals to communicate
preferentially with like-minded peers [33, 34]. To investi-
gate this point, we consider the simple case of two weakly
connected communities by examining the network of on-
line political blogs analysed in Adamic and Glance’s work
on the polarized political blogosphere two months before
the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election [29], which shows two
distinct communities: Democratic and Republican lean-
ing blogs.
6The original dataset constructs a directed network so
we will focus on the greatest weakly connected compo-
nent which contains 1222 blogs and 19089 links out of the
total 1490 blogs and 19090 links and use an undirected
representation of this network. The remaining network is
split nearly into two equal sized communities: 586 liberal
blogs and 636 conservative blogs. The two community
structure of this network then provides a natural divi-
sion for knowledge of the two opinions in the binary NG
with one community being the source for the new social
convention. For this network then we will focus on two
scenarios of the NG:
1. In the first scenario agents begin with knowledge of
opinion A or B dependent on the community they
are a part of, with a select group from the first
community committed to A;
2. In the second scenario everyone knows opinion B
except for the group committed to A in the first
community.
The activity is defined as the propensity of each node
to engage in social interactions. For each node i, it is pro-
portional to the ratio between the number of interactions
involving the node and the total number of interactions
in the system. Formally, the activity is then ai = η
si∑
j
sj
where si is the strength of i, i.e. total number of inter-
action of i, and η is a rescaling factor. In the dataset we
consider here, we have information just about the num-
ber of different peers, the degree ki, in contact with i.
For this reason, we generate the activity rates from the
real data considering the normalized degree for individ-
ual blogs or agents in the network ai = η
ki∑
i
ki
. At each
time step active agents connect to an inactive neighbor
chosen among those for which they have an existing link
to in the original dataset. This preserves the commu-
nity structure, allows for an activity-driven creation of
links in the network and produces a ranking of agents
by which we can select activists. In contrast to the ac-
tivity driven networks previously considered, where the
distribution of activity rates were given by a power law
with exponent γ = 2.5, this political blogosphere network
exhibits a power law distribution of normalized degrees
with γ ≈ 1.465 ± 0.014. We use η = 50 to raise the ac-
tivities so that the number of active agents per time step
in this network is at least 1.
Figure 4 shows the results of the NG played out in this
community structured network in comparison to a ran-
dom rewiring of the network (shown in the inset) in the
first scenario detailed above. Agents begin with knowl-
edge of opinion A or B depending on the community they
are a part of and we select a group within community A
to be committed. Iconv is now the number of interactions
required to get 95% or more of the network to hold only
opinion A. We lower the conditions for convergence from
100% of the network holding only opinion A to 95% to
guarantee a faster yet accurate estimation of the thresh-
old.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Iconv in the NG on a real network of
N = 1222 agents containing two weakly connected communities
vs a random rewiring of the network (inset). Agents begin with
knowledge of opinion A or B dependent upon the community they
are originally a part of with a select group in community A re-
maining committed to A. Iconv is the number of interactions at
which 95% or more of the network agrees upon opinion A. In both
the original community based network and the rewired network,
shown in the insets, activists (bottom) show considerable advan-
tage over randomly selected committed minorities (top) in needing
fewer committed agents.
Rewired networks are obtained by reshuffling the end
points of the links, which destroys the community struc-
ture without altering the degree, and therefore activity, of
each blog. The comparison of the results obtained in the
real network against those obtained in the rewired net-
work is crucial to highlight and isolate the effects of the
community structure. Numerical results, shown in Fig-
ure 4, indicate that once again activists demonstrate a
considerable advantage over a randomly selected commit-
ted minority in both the original two community network
(pca = 0.04 vs pcr = 0.15, thresholds for activists and a
randomly selected committed minority, respectively) and
the rewired network shown in the inset (pca = 4.0× 10−3
vs pcr = 0.05; 5 blogs vs 62 blogs) with activists need-
ing a significantly smaller minimal committed group to
convince the rest of the population to their position.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Iconv in the NG on a real network of
N = 1222 agents containing two weakly connected communities
vs a random rewiring of the network (inset). All agents begin
with knowledge of opinion B, regardless of their original commu-
nity membership except for a select group in community A who
remain committed to A. Iconv is the number of interactions at
which 95% or more of the network agrees upon opinion A. In both
the original community based network and the rewired network,
shown in the insets, activists (bottom) show considerable advan-
tage over randomly selected committed minorities (top) in needing
fewer committed agents.
Figure 5 shows the results of the NG in the second
scenario. All agents begin with knowledge of opinion
B except for a small segment of the population in one
community who introduce opinion A and remain com-
mitted to their cause. This scenario is similar to the ini-
tial configuration we previously considered for activists
in activity-driven networks. Again Iconv is the number of
interactions required to get 95% or more of the network
to hold only opinion A. Here activists show the same
advantage over a random committed minority, needing
a smaller minimal committed group in both the origi-
nal network (pca = 0.05 vs pcr = 0.15) and the rewired
network (pca = 9× 10−3 vs pcr = 0.088).
Finally, Figures 4 and 5 also show that the original net-
work (main panels) requires a larger minimal committed
group to persuade the rest of the population to their po-
sition than the rewired networks (insets). Thus, commu-
nity structures present in the network inhibit the spread-
ing of opinion A and hinder the effectiveness of commit-
ted agents. Even activists in the community structured
network need a larger minimum a size of the network (at
least ∼ 4%) to spread their message, an order of magni-
tude higher than required in the rewired network for the
first scenario.
V. CONCLUSION
We investigated the role of committed individuals in
the Naming Game model on activity-driven networks.
First, we considered a variant of the Naming Game, in
which only the listeners update their opinion, consider-
ing a homogenous distribution of activity. Interestingly,
we found the critical threshold pc, defining the minimal
fraction of committed individuals needed for a fast opin-
ion flipping of the majority, to be smaller than the same
value obtained when both agents negotiate their posi-
tions. Then we considered the presence of heterogeneous
activity patterns in the propensity to communicate. Sur-
prisingly, we found that this characteristic, observed in
many networks, does not alter the critical threshold pc.
Furthermore, we considered the effects of activists by cor-
relating activity, or propensity to speak, with commit-
ment. We found that activists can reduce their numbers
by two orders of magnitude compared to random com-
mitted agents and still persuade their peers to adopt their
opinion or social convention. Finally, we considered the
presence of communities in a real social network. We
showed that communities inhibit the ability of commit-
ted agents to effectively spread their message and subse-
quently require larger committed groups to convince the
rest of the population to join their position.
Taken together our results indicate that strategically
selecting individuals for a given cause or social conven-
tion can greatly reduce the cost of associated campaigns
in terms of the sheer number of individuals needed for
its success. It is worth noticing that an approach similar
to the one presented here was proposed in [25] for the
rumor spreading model [35], with the difference that the
authors considered a static network mimicking the fact
that agents would remember their connections and ex-
plore only a fixed subset of the network. Recent results
on the effects of social memory and the heterogeneity of
social ties on spreading phenomena suggests that future
work may benefit from including more realistic partner
selection mechanisms also in temporal networks to better
reflect what is observed in real social networks [30, 36–
38]. Other interesting points left for future exploration
are the influence of fatigue on demobilization and disen-
gagement of activists [39, 40] (here modeled as endlessly
committed), and the role of broadcasting agents able to
reach a large part of the population (i.e., mass media)
in the spirit of previous studies that addressed this point
for Axelrod’s model of the dissemination of culture [41].
8APPENDIX
To find a critical threshold for the NG in activity driven
networks we need to find the conditions under which so-
lutions for x and y exist. The rate equations for both
tell us that their solutions rely on the existence of valid
solutions for X˜ , Y˜ , and Z˜. First we will consider our
definition for Z˜ =
∑
a z
aa. To determine the existence of
valid solutions for Z˜ we need an expression for za. The
definition for z gives us a hint of how to define za: it is
the density of agents with activity class a who are not in
state in A or B:
za =
Na
N
− xa − ya − pa (20)
The term Na/N is simply the density of all agents with
activity class a and with activity rates fixed a priori
this term must also be fixed. On the other hand the
probability of agents being in activity class a is given
by the probability distribution function P (a), therefore
Na/N = P (a). With this za and Z˜ become:
za =P (a)− xa − ya − pP (a) (21)
Z˜ =
∑
a
zaa =
〈
a
〉− X˜ − Y˜ − p〈a〉 (22)
Now we see that the existence of solutions for x and y
relies only on the existence of valid solutions for X˜ and
Y˜ . The steady states for X˜ and Y˜ are found through
a fixed point stability analysis of their rate equations.
These rate equations are obtained by multiplying (11)
and (12) by a and then summing over all classes to yield:
˙˜
X = −X˜Y˜ + 1
2
X˜Z˜ +
1
2
Z˜2 + Z˜p
〈
a
〉
(23)
˙˜
Y = −X˜Y˜ + 1
2
Y˜ Z˜ +
1
2
Z˜2 − Y˜ p〈a〉 (24)
The steady state solutions for X˜ and Y˜ are then found
to be:
(X˜, Y˜ ) =

a− ap, 0
a
6
(
1− 7p−
√
δ
)
,
a
3
(
2− 2p+
√
δ
)
a
6
(
1− 7p+
√
δ
)
,
a
3
(
2− 2p−
√
δ
)
(25)
δ = 1− 14p+ p2
The first of these solutions represents the trivial case
where the entire population begins in the state knowing
only opinion A (consensus), whether they are committed
or not since Y˜ = 0 and thus y = 0.
The other two solutions lead to stable opinion states
of the population with restrictions on the value of p. The
first of these restrictions comes from the fact that opinion
states must remain physical and thus the discriminant
δ = 1− 14p+ p2 > 0. From this two limiting values of p
result: pc = 7 ± 4
√
3, however only the lesser of these is
valid as a value of p since p is a density and must be in
the interval of (0, 1).
This is the same critical threshold for pc obtained from
the fixed point stability analysis of the NG on homoge-
neous or non-activity driven networks.
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